# Theory and Practice of Cryptography From Classical to Modern

## About this Course

All course materials: <u>http://saweis.net/crypto.shtml</u>

Four Lectures:

- 1. History and foundations of modern cryptography.
- 2. Using cryptography in practice and at Google.
- 3. Theory of cryptography: proofs and definitions.
- 4. A special topic in cryptography.

# Classic Definition of Cryptography

*Kryptósgráfo*, or the art of "hidden writing", classically meant hiding the contents or existence of messages from an adversary.


Informally, *encryption* renders the contents of a message unintelligible to anyone not possessing some secret information.

Steganography, or "covered writing", is concerned with hiding the existence of a message -- often in plain sight.

#### **Scytale Transposition Cipher**



#### **Caesar Substitution Cipher**



#### **Zodiac Cipher**


# Δ Ш Р / Z / U В Ш Я О R Ж 9 Х Ж В WV + 3 G У F О Δ Н Р Ш К Т Р У 3 M J / Λ U I Я Δ Р Т L N G У D 0 0 S Ø / Δ Ш В Р О R A U Ш 7 R J P E X A L M Z T U Я \ 9 F H V W 3 4 У I + 9 G D Δ K I 0 P X 4 0 0 R N L I Y E J Ο 4 P G B T Q S Ш В L 0 / Р Ш В Ш Х Р Е Н М U Л R R Х


#### Vigenère Polyalphabetic Substitution

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZA C C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B D D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD F F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E G G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F H H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G I I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H J J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I K K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J L L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K M M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L N N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M O O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N P P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O Q Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q S S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R T T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S U U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T V V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U W W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V XXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW Y Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X ZZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXY

Key: GOOGLE Plaintext: BUYYOUTUBE Ciphertext: HIMEZYZIPK

#### **Rotor-based Polyalphabetic Ciphers**





# Steganography

- He rodotus tattoo and wax tablets
- Invisible ink
- Mic rodots
- "Th e Finger"
- Priso n gang codes
- Low-order bits

#### Codes

Codes replace a specific piece of plaintext with a predefined code word. Codes are essentially a substitution cipher, but can replace strings of symbols rather than just individual symbols.

Examples:

- "One if by land, two if by sea."
- Beale code
- Numbers stations
- ECB Mode

#### Kerckhoffs' Principle

A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about it is public knowledge except the secret key.

Do not rely on "security through obscurity".

### **One-Time Pads**

Generate a random key of equal length to your message, then exclusive-or (XOR) the key with your message.

This is information theoretically secure...but:

- "To transmit a large secret message, first transmit a large secret message"
- One time means one time.
- Need to transmit a key per message per recipient.
- Keys are as big as messages.

# Problems with Classical Crypto

<u>Weak:</u> Pen and paper, and mechanical cryptosystems became weak in the face of modern computers.

Informal: Constructions were ad hoc. There weren't publicly available security definitions or proofs of security.

<u>Closed:</u> Cryptographic knowledge and technology was primarily only available to military or intelligence agencies.

Key distribution: The number of keys in the system grows quadratically with the number of parties.

# Modern Cryptographic Era

- Standardization of cryptographic primitives
- Invention of public key cryptography
- Formalization of security definitions
- Growth of computing and the internet
- Liberalization of cryptographic restrictions

#### **Government Standardization**

- Data Encryption Standard (DES): A strong, standardized 56-bit cipher designed for modern computers
- Originally designed by IBM and called "Lucifer". Tweaked by the NSA and published in 1975.
- In 1999, a DES key was brute forced in 24 hours for \$100K
- Triple DES (3DES): Effectively 112-bit cipher. Still in use.
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is modern heir to DES, and was designed by academics in a public competition.
- AES supports 128-bit and larger keys.

# **Key Distribution Problem**

- How do Alice and Bob first agree on a shared key?
- What happens if either party is compromised?
- What happens when Carol wants to talk to Alice and Bob?

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (1976) / Williamson (1974):

Generate a shared secret with a stranger over a public channel.

- 1. Alice picks a group G, generator g, and a random value x
- Alice computes A = g<sup>x</sup> and sends Bob (G, g, A)
- 3. Bob picks a random y, computes B = gy, and sends Alice B
- 4. Alice computes  $K = B^x = g^x(xy)$
- 5. Bob computes  $K = A^y = g^{(xy)}$

Eve's sees (G, g, A, B) = (G, g,  $g^x$ ,  $g^y$ ) How hard is it for her to compute  $g^(xy)$ ?

Note: "^" is the power operator, not an XOR

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Does this solve the key distribution problem? Not quite..

- Still need to establish n<sup>2</sup> keys for n people or conduct interactive key exchange protocols for each message.
- Computation over appropriate groups can be expensive
- Vulnerable to a man in the middle attack

# **Public Key Encryption**

What if you could publish a "public" key that anyone could use to encrypt, but not decrypt messages?

- 1. A public key cryptosystem consists of (G, E, D).
- Alice generates a key pair: G(r)→(PKa, SKa)
- 3. Alice publishes her public key PKa
- 4. Bob encrypts a message with her public key:  $E(PK_a,m) \rightarrow c$
- 5. Alice decrypts a ciphertext with her secret key: D(SKa,c) → m

# **Public Key Encryption**

Nice properties:

- Only one key per person, not per pair.
- Can communicate with a stranger without agreeing on a key.

Problems with public key cryptography:

- Is this even possible?
- How do you get Alice's public key?
- Why do you trust the ciphertext?

# **RSA Encryption**

Published in 1977 / Cocks 1973

Based on hardness of factoring products of large primes.

- 1. Setup: n = pq, PK = (e, n), SK = d, ed = 1 mod (p-1)(q-1)
- 2.  $E(PK, m) = m^e \pmod{n} = c$
- 3.  $D(SK, c) = c^d \pmod{n} = m^{ed} \pmod{n} = m^{ed} (mod n) =$

Problems?

- Ciphertext is fixed size
- Computation is still relatively expensive.
- Why do you trust the ciphertext has not been modified?
- Not semantically secure (lecture 3)

#### What about authentication?

- How do we know Alice is Alice?
- How do we know a message originated from Alice?
- How do we know Alice's message was not altered in transit?

#### Message Authentication Codes

- Alice and Bob share a secret key k.
- Either can sign (or MAC) a message: Sign(k, m) $\rightarrow \sigma$
- The recipient can verify the signature: Verify(k, m,  $\sigma$ )
- Often built from other primitives
- Similar key distribution problems to ciphers

# **Public Key Signatures**

Only you can sign messages, but anyone in the world can verify them. Public-key analog of a MAC.

- 1. A public key signature scheme consists of (G, Sign, Ver).
- 2. Alice generates a key pair:  $G(r) \rightarrow (VK_a, SK_a)$
- 3. Alice publishes her verifying key VKa
- 4. Alice signs a message: Sign(SK<sub>a</sub>, m)  $\rightarrow \sigma$
- 5. Bob verifies a signature with her verifying key: Ver(VKa,m)

## **Public Key Signatures**

- Is a public key signature scheme possible?
- How do we distribute verification keys?
- RSA is fixed size. How do we sign big messages?

## Message Digests

- Message digests compress input to fixed length strings.
- No keys involved.
- <u>One-wayness</u>: It is hard to find an input that hashes to a pre-specified value.
- <u>Collision resistance</u>: Finding any two inputs having the same hash-value is difficult.
- Fixed-length public signature schemes can sign digests instead of the actual message.

# Key Distribution: Still a problem

How do you know someone's public key is their own?

- Certificates: A signature on a public key or another certificate
- PKI: A graph of relationships between keys.
   Certificate authorities
   A "web-of-trust" social graph

How do we revoke keys?

- Expiration dates
- Certificate Revocation Lists

#### The Rest of the Course

Exercise Set 1: Posted on http://go/cryptocourse

Lecture 2: Using cryptography in practice. Engineering-oriented

Lecture 3: Theory of cryptography. Math-oriented.

Lecture 4: A special crypto topic. General audience.